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Political Ideas and ‘Real’ Politics 
 
 
How important are political ideas for understanding ‘real’ politics? Among political 
historians, the whole spectrum of answers has been proposed. At one extreme, it seems, are 
those who have stressed the centrality of ideas: for instance, that the influence of Locke, 
Smith, and Bentham can be traced, sooner or later, into the practice of routine politics. At the 
other extreme, and in resistance to this, are those who see politics in a realist vein: interest 
and power are, within and between states, the determining factors in political life, with ideas 
little more than, at best, a rhetorical flourish. Clearly, part of the difficulty resides in what is 
meant by political ideas. Typically, historians of ideas still tend to refer to what might be 
called upper-case ‘I’ ideas – the arguments of a relatively restricted canon of sophisticated 
political theorists. But there are also what we might call lower-case ‘i’ ideas – the sorts of 
beliefs held by all manner of everyday actors which constitute their understanding of the 
political world and which will affect their actions in relation to it (Macintyre, 1983). There is, 
of course, no clear-cut distinction between the two, nor any necessary reason to suppose that 
a canonical thinker was recognised as such in their own time. 
 
A strength of the work of Bevir and Rhodes is that they – separately and collectively – take 
small ‘i’ ideas seriously. Because of their commitment to what they call ‘situated agency’ 
they recognise the centrality of the beliefs and desires of individual agents even as they locate 
these within broader traditions. Because of their commitment to antiessentialism, but in the 
form of pragmatic realism (Bevir, 2010: 60-1), they do not instantiate a dichotomy between 
ideas and reality – in Charles Taylor’s words ‘ideas always come wrapped up in certain forms 
of practices’ (Taylor, 2004: 33). Since Interpreting British Governance was published in 
2003 they have sought to apply these arguments to the understanding of modern governance. 
Bevir (2005; 2010) has shown how the arguments and assumptions of different styles of 
social science – first rational choice and then new institutionalism – have shaped new patterns 
of governance and brought new ideological and practical dilemmas to the fore. His concern is 
primarily to trace the intellectual traditions underpinning and shaping contemporary practice. 
Rhodes (2011), meanwhile, has applied an ethnographic approach: by observing the everyday 
lives of ministers and permanent secretaries in three government departments he is able to 
show how the routines and rituals of a wide variety of actors – the role of the diary secretary, 
for instance, is stressed – make an institution work, in good times and in bad.  
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No doubt most political scientists will primarily be interested in what this can tell us about 
governance. Here, though, I want to approach the question of the interpretive approach to 
politics by a different route, and to begin by stressing the centrality of the history of ideas as a 
subfield. Bevir’s training was as an intellectual historian: his 1989 DPhil explored ‘British 
Socialist Thought, 1880-1900’, and in the 1990s he published a number of articles on 
nineteenth century social and political thought. Indeed, this interest has never disappeared, as 
various publications throughout the 2000s show – not least his 2011 Making of British 
Socialism. Dissatisfied with the prevailing methodologies of this subfield, Bevir also spent 
the 1990s developing his own philosophical approach which appeared as The Logic of the 
History of Ideas in 1999. Even though some of the terms and arguments have been refined, 
the centrality of this book to the subsequent work of Bevir and Rhodes cannot be exaggerated 
– it sits behind everything. Its title, however, does not do justice to its ambition. Bevir was 
not just interested in the history of ideas as a way to understand canonical thinkers but in its 
potential to situate the beliefs and desires of all agents in a meaningful context, and to use 
this to understand their behaviour. Hence, as Melissa Lane noted, his concern was not so 
much ‘large “I” ideas’ as ‘small “I” ideas’ (Lane, 2002: 34). 
 
Both Bevir and Rhodes want to use their interpretive approach as a means of rethinking the 
practice of political science. In part they do this through philosophical engagement with 
alternative epistemologies and methodologies, but they also stress the importance of 
disciplinary genealogies. In Modern Political Science (Adcock et al, 2007) they and their 
collaborators examine the historical development of their discipline, showing the different 
routes taken by Anglo-American political science over the last century, from the eclipse of 
developmental historicism, through empiricist modernism, to the emergence of new 
institutionalism. The radical historicism outlined in the Logic shapes their approach, but they 
also argue that such histories are important to contemporary political science – they 
undermine caricatures of past scholarship and recapture lost insights, they can help us refine 
the concepts in current use and clarify the beliefs we study. Crucially, radical historicism 
‘undermines the assumptions of the natural, progressive, or disinterested character of the 
development of political science and the institutions that it informs and by which it is 
informed’ (Adcock, et al, 2007: 15) and enables us to evaluate alternative approaches. The 
history of political science is therefore part of the subject of political science. 
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This chapter aims to contribute to the task of exploring the history of political science, and in 
particular its relationship to political thought and political history. In an earlier essay (Craig, 
2010) I tried to show how an influential style of ‘high political’ history – the ‘Peterhouse 
School’ of Maurice Cowling – could be understood in a more anthropological light, and that, 
as a result, could be seen as a part of a broad tradition to which Bevir and Rhodes belong. 
Indeed, Cowling’s Nature and Limits of Political Science has made fleeting appearances in 
their work (Bevir and Rhodes, 1999: 233; 2003: 43). Here, I want to look at a strand of 
development taken by the ‘Cambridge School’ of the history of political thought. While the 
influence of Quentin Skinner is well understood, that of John Dunn is rather less so. This is 
relevant to Bevir’s work: while he disagrees with Skinner’s methodology, his Logic 
nevertheless emerges out of close engagement with the arguments of the ‘Cambridge 
School’. There is an affinity between them. But while Skinner has largely remained 
concerned with the history of ideas, Dunn’s significance arises from his more direct interest 
in the way that hermeneutic approaches can be applied to political science and the 
explanatory challenges they raise. Yet, despite the potential synergies between Bevir and 
Dunn, the latter has made only the most cursory of appearances in the former’s work. In what 
follows I trace the development of Dunn’s thinking – an exercise in intellectual history – to 
show how his interpretive commitments have posed important questions about the nature of 
explanation in the social sciences and about the irreducibility of political judgment, and how 
these underpin a particular style of ‘realism’ in recent political theory. 
 
John Dunn, Political Thought, and Political Science 
 
Dunn’s first book on The Political Thought of John Locke was published in 1969, and was 
quickly championed as a manifesto for a new style of contextualised history of political 
thought. Certainly, it was written in reaction to two dominant styles of interpretation at that 
time. On the one hand were the philosophers who tended to view the historical specificity of 
texts with ‘massive indifference’ and instead found them stimulating largely according to 
contemporary concerns – the danger here was anachronism (Dunn, 1996: 19). On the other 
hand were those historians – especially Marxists – who explained the significance of a text by 
reference to the social relations of the period, as if the author’s expressed intentions were of 
little concern. But Dunn’s interest was not just to restore the historical identity to an argument 
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from the past – indeed this might be seen as a ‘trivial’ ambition – but to encourage 
recognition that the philosophical and historical approaches were ‘logically indispensable 
complements’ (Dunn, 1969: 208). What, he later explained, he was groping for was 
something like Quine’s holism – an understanding of the internal connections and relations of 
a person’s thinking (Dunn, 1990: 10). 
 
The groping can first be seen in an influential article of the preceding year. Dunn wanted to 
bring into harmony the two approaches just mentioned, namely a satisfactory philosophical 
account of an individual’s ideas and an adequate historical account of them. The objections 
made to typical histories of philosophy are now familiar. They were histories of ‘fictions’: 
rational constructions were squeezed into formal articulations which could not have 
historically been possible (1980: 15). These histories only focused on one of two necessary 
things – ‘the set of argued propositions in the past which discuss how the political world is 
and ought to be and what should constitute the criteria for proper action within it’ (1980: 20). 
The defenders of these histories were concerned only with the coherence of a set of 
propositions, and with commenting on the status of this coherence in relation to 
contemporary criteria of rationality. Hence, Dunn argued, the central concern was the truth or 
falsity of what the philosopher being studied had maintained.
 
This style of explanation was 
therefore ‘rational’. Dunn was not opposed to this as such – after all, a part of understanding 
why, for instance, Plato criticised Thrasymachus’s conception of justice will require 
unearthing the premises which made the arguments seem cogent (1980: 16). His own work 
on Locke tried to restore as much coherence as possible to what Locke maintained (Dunn, 
1969: xi). But, he argued, this was not enough – we also needed an explanation of why Locke 
– or anyone else – maintained what he did. The philosophical histories were bloodless – they 
were histories with ‘breathing, excreting, hating, mocking’ left out (Dunn, 1980: 20). 
Thinking was an activity and its history was a history of people struggling to make sense of 
their experiences. Hence, the history of thought needed to consider the actions which were 
being engaged in when statements were made – propositions had a place in the real world and 
statements were made by real speakers (1980: 20, 21). It was in this regard that Dunn’s 
engagement with Austin’s speech-act theory was at its strongest1 – one cannot always know 
                                                          
1
 Although Skinner’s owed his introduction to Austin’s speech act theory to Dunn, and was to make substantial 
use of it in his various methodological writings, Dunn himself made no further explicit reference to Austin after 
this essay. 
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what someone meant unless one knew what someone was doing, as, for example, in 
understanding cases of irony or parody.
2
 In these senses, then, there was a ‘causal’ approach 
to the history of thought. That said, Dunn did not want to push this aspect too far – the error 
of those who saw ideas as simply the expression of social relations. While there might be 
room to explain some aspects of a text as the ideological expression of a group, this could 
never explain all its aspects – the Republic might in part have been written as an apologia for 
the declining Athenian elite, but that could not explain all of what Plato wrote.  
 
Dunn’s aim was not so much to establish a new school of the history of political thought as to 
consider the relationship between intellectual and social history – and, as we shall see, his 
thinking had implications for both types of history. He was interested in the philosophy of 
explanation, and cited Collingwood, Gardiner, Dray, Gallie, Danto, Kuhn and Gombrich as 
particular influences. But he was unwilling to declare a side in the ‘venerable dispute’ 
between idealist and positivist philosophies of history (1980: 17). He did not think all 
potentially explanatory questions were of a piece. To ask why Plato criticised 
Thrasymachus’s conception of justice, or why the Roman Empire collapsed, or why the 
French Revolution happened, were different sorts of questions which lent themselves to 
different sorts of answers. In the first case, no set of causal laws could possibly supply an 
explanation, but in the latter two cases he did not see how answers based on ‘reasons’ could 
ever be adequate. ‘No explanation of the persistence and change of a complex social system 
over time can be adequately provided by a story’ (1980: 17). Because of Dunn’s strong 
interest in the importance of history and sociology in understanding politics (Dunn, 1972: 
xiii), he could not see any way of abandoning some kind of commitment to causal laws 
(Dunn 1980: 20n). Rather, one needed accounts that stressed ‘reasons’ as well as ‘causes’, 
and this was particularly the case with the histories of ideas. These needed to explore the 
history of political arguments, the coherence of a person’s ideas, though there was always the 
danger of imposing anachronistic assessments of rationality (Dunn, 1980: 26-7). Hence, they 
needed also to consider the history of political arguing, which looked at the explanations of 
                                                          
2
 He adds, however, that since we know nothing of Plato’s emotional and cognitive states, were we precluded 
from understanding their meaning? ‘Must it not in any case be possible to elicit the correct identification of 
the meaning from the text itself?’ (Dunn, 1980: 23). See Bevir’s (1999: 134-9) opposition to the idea that 
identifying what someone ‘was doing’ was part of the meaning of an utterance. 
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why particular arguments were made at a particular time. This ensured that the history of 
ideas could be a part of real social history.  
 
These concerns with explanation in the human sciences were to become, if anything, more 
central in the following ten years. It is worth stressing that in this period Dunn had very little 
to say about the history of political thought. Since his conclusion – later retracted (Dunn, 
1990: 9) – to his book on Locke had been that he could not ‘conceive of constructing an 
analysis of any issue in contemporary political theory around the affirmation or negation of 
anything which Locke says about political matters’ (Dunn, 1969: x), it seems possible that he 
did not see how historical reconstructions of the thought of philosophers was necessarily 
terribly illuminating about the present. In any event, he turned instead to empirical political 
history and social science. In 1972 he published Modern Revolutions, a series of case-studies 
of twentieth century revolutions designed to rebut prevailing social science explanations. We 
will return to the subject of revolution shortly. He was also pursuing an interest in the 
development of post-colonial West Africa. This resulted in a co-written study of a province 
of Ghana (Dunn and Robertson, 1973), based on detailed archival work and wide-ranging 
interviews, and an edited collection of case-studies of individual states (Dunn, 1978). 
Although by this point Dunn’s interests were turning back to political theory, he had in the 
meantime ample occasion for thinking about problems of explanation in the social sciences. 
  
Practising Social Science 
 
These thoughts culminated in ‘Practising history and social science on “realist” assumptions’, 
published in 1978. Dunn by this point showed familiarity with recent post-analytic 
philosophy, and was aware of the attacks on traditional epistemology by those working in the 
pragmatist tradition, especially Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. While he suggested that 
the implications of these arguments for social science were not yet fully clear (Dunn, 1980: 3-
4, 109), what was apparent was that historicist and rationalist perspectives on cognition had 
been brought into closer harmony – part of the aim of the 1968 article. Certainly, he argued, 
any attempt to ground political theory in the analysis of supposedly ‘timeless ethical 
concepts’ was doomed to failure (1980: 3). The main aim of the essay was to consider what 
sort of knowledge of humans was possible, contrasting what might be called the interpretive 
or hermeneutic approach, which focused on human properties as humans understood them, 
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with the naturalist or positivist approach which ‘laundered out’ all the anthropocentric 
properties (1980: 6). He wanted to commit as far as possible to the former approach – which 
took very seriously human beliefs, and the beliefs embodied in action – but at the same time 
without abandoning an appreciation of ‘a context of social causality’ which set limits to what 
any individual human being could do (1980: 7).  
 
Before exploring these arguments further, it will be useful to consider Macintyre’s work on 
the philosophy of social science. The essays in Against the Self-Images of the Age (1971) and 
especially a further essay published in 1973 had a substantial influence on Dunn, judging by 
repeated references to these works. (There are also striking parallels with the arguments of 
Bevir and Rhodes, for instance in the understanding of institutions.) Although, as Turner 
(2005) shows, Macintyre switched over the course of the sixties from a strong commitment to 
explanation of meaningful action solely in terms of reasons to explanations which stressed 
both reasons and causes, his broader critique of positivist social science – for instance, 
behaviourism – remained strong. Many of his core themes come together in ‘Ideology, Social 
Science and Revolution’ (1973), which offered a sustained attack on the special claims to 
knowledge offered both by the positivist and by the ideologist. As with his earlier work, it 
begins with the need to identify an action – as distinct from a movement – by capturing ‘the 
intention embodied in the action and the meaning the agent attaches to what he is doing’ 
(1973: 323). Because of the social character of language, agents cannot characterise their 
actions in entirely egocentric ways – their descriptions will have some kind of implicit 
reference to social criteria: ‘In order for his action to be what the agent takes it to be, it must 
be such that others can construe it in the same way’ (1973: 324). In addition, since an agent’s 
intentions were inseparable from his beliefs, actions presuppose a wider web of beliefs – for 
instance, taking a sheep to market presupposes a web of beliefs about economy and 
husbandry. For other agents to understand such actions requires some measure of shared 
beliefs, but because a great deal of divergence of belief can exist within a shared community, 
agents are oriented to making their actions intelligible, and so our beliefs about our actions 
always have some reference to what others believe about our actions and about our beliefs. 
Hence ‘the’ action cannot be identified independently of the beliefs both of the agent, and of 
other agents with whom he or she interacts. Drawing on Garfinkel and Goffman, Macintyre 
sees agents trying to understand the behaviour of others – including their attempts to 
understand him – within their own evolving scripts or ‘theories’ (1973: 325). Most of the 
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time agents are largely unaware of the complex and skilful negotiations which social life 
makes upon them – only in dramatically new or challenging situations do we suddenly 
become aware of these demands (1973: 327-8). 
 
If this represents the social situation of ordinary agents, it had important epistemological 
consequences, notably the real challenges in determining the actions of other agents. It might 
be difficult to know which range of descriptions to apply to behaviour, and even if that was 
known, which of the possible range had primary status for the agent. Yet the task of imputing 
intentions to others cannot be evaded because we frame our ‘intentions, purposes, attitudes, 
and emotions’ in response to those we see in others (1973: 329). So, even though our 
ascriptions cannot be warranted by the evidence – and mistakes and misunderstandings will 
creep in – we nevertheless have to make do with them. Another difficulty was that this 
characterisation of social life compromised an agent’s ability to predict the future. In a ‘game 
theoretic’ situation multiple agents were all trying to achieve their aims while recognising 
that ‘no one agent can put a limit on the possibilities that may be opened by the reflections of 
other agents’ (1973: 330). Even regularities, once observed, could be used to mislead. For 
these and other reasons agents cannot accurately predict the future. These characteristics were 
central to all social life. The result was that on the one hand humans cannot avoid relying 
upon the generalizations that help them fix the expectations of others, but that those very 
generalizations were constantly breaking down: ‘we are all being surprised a great deal of the 
time’ (1973: 332; also Macintyre, 1971: 243). The rest of the article argued that social 
scientists – whatever their positivist ambitions – could not transcend the epistemological 
limits of ordinary agents, but that all agents could try to avoid becoming victims of these 
limits by becoming more explicitly conscious of them – by recognising the concepts and 
categories we use in interpreting others and forming our own intentions (Macintyre, 1973: 
336). 
 
These themes are never far from Dunn’s essay. He began by defining the core subject matter 
of human science as ‘human acts taken under intentional descriptions, past, present and 
future, and the causes and consequences of such acts’ (Dunn, 1980: 85). Throughout, he was 
critical of various styles of positivist social science. Like Macintyre and Taylor, he opposed 
behaviourism for its untenable claim that intentional categories be eliminated, and argued that 
even if they could such a science could not serve any humanly useful purpose (1980: 85-6). 
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He was also opposed to those social scientists who claimed that elements of an agent’s self-
description could be replaced with descriptions supplied by the observer – there were no 
criteria by which to judge such terms as superior, and in any case, Dunn continued, there 
were no viable laws of psychology or sociology which could explain motivation (1980: 104). 
Drawing on Macintyre (1973), he explained the difficulties of formulating laws in the human 
sciences. To be sure, one could identify past regularities, but if these were to explain 
outcomes they needed to take the form of conditional law-like generalisations, and he did not 
see any way criteria for counterfactual testing could be specified (Dunn, 1980: 100-1; see 
Macintyre, 1973: 333-4). Moreover, once regularities had been discovered they then become 
themselves elements open to manipulation – the theory contaminated the data. Hence, he 
argued, ‘there are probably not any serious candidates for such law-like generalisations of 
any scope or interest in the more descriptively oriented social sciences’ (Dunn, 1980: 101). 
Rather than concluding that social science was not possible – Macintyre’s argument – a 
greater degree of cognitive humility was desirable on the part of social scientists. 
 
Dunn’s approach was ‘strongly’, even ‘vigorously’ hermeneutic (Dunn, 1980: 94, 104).3 It 
took the beliefs and desires of agents seriously and argued that the history of such beings 
cannot deny their possession of intellect and cannot occur behind their backs (1980: 95). 
Much of the essay was a series of related reflections on how this could be made practicable to 
the enquirer and what its limits might be. To understand the action of a person would require 
a full account of the beliefs and desires the agent would have honestly and thoughtfully given 
of their action. There might be grounds for supplementing this account – for instance by 
reference to sociological or psychological considerations – so long as we could know that 
they were relevant but unmentioned aspects of the agent’s actions. Dunn has in mind factors 
such as denial, self-deception, and rationalisation, as well as ideology and social 
determination of belief. All these might be relevant aspects of explanation, but only so long 
as they could be shown within an agent’s ‘own mapping of his “problem situation”’(1980: 
105). Once we have the best description which an agent can offer, we may be able to 
                                                          
3
 See also his essay on Charles Taylor, where he suggests Taylor was incautious in advocating a science of 
interpretation, and that although he, Dunn, would incline on most occasions to the hermeneutic when offered 
a choice, this was for heuristic reasons, and he would expect to meet objections as they came rather than 
designing ‘some comprehensive piece of pseudo-epistemological apparatus’ which could rule out those 
objections in advance. ‘Humanly speaking, the interpretative commitment is a good deal more enticing as a 
declaration of intention than it is as a claim to achievement’. (Dunn, 1990: 183-4). 
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enlighten the agent to himself by showing that his description was inaccurate or misleading, 
but what we ‘cannot do is claim to know that we understand him or his action better than he 
does himself’ (1980: 105).4 The validity of any interpretation of an action will ultimately 
depend on the ‘economy and accuracy’ with which it handles ‘the full text of the agent’s 
description’ (1980: 106). 
 
Dunn countered various criticisms. One complaint might be that his account was highly 
individualist. He happily accepted this – he was opposed to those social holists who argued 
that social wholes could be understood without reference to the truth or falsity of any 
individual action. He also denied those who asserted that his argument committed him to the 
view that all statements about social wholes could be broken down into statements about 
individuals – i.e. he did not think his view committed him to methodological individualism. 
(These arguments are repeatedly stressed by Bevir and Rhodes as well.) This can be seen in 
his hermeneutic approach to institutions, which, again, draws on Macintyre.
5
 In a favoured 
quotation, Macintyre suggested that ‘it is an obvious truism that no institution or practice is 
what it is, or does what it does, independent of what anyone whatsoever thinks or feels about 
it. For institutions are always partially, even if to differing degrees, constituted by what 
certain people think or feel about them’ (cited in Dunn, 1980: 89; Macintyre, 1971: 263). In 
practice it might be difficult to specify the boundary between those whose thoughts 
constituted the institution and those who were external to it – was the British state constituted 
by all its citizens, or only some of them? And, clearly, it was also partially constituted by 
citizens of other states. ‘There is no such thing as the British state tout court’, and this 
problem showed that one of the practical difficulties of social science was the ‘gross 
vagueness’ of many of its central terms (Dunn, 1980: 89).6 Any regularities in the persistence 
of institutions were the result of the beliefs and actions of agents, and might cease to be 
regularities once they were uncovered as such (1980: 90, 94). But that did not mean that such 
                                                          
4
 The claim to know more than someone does about their own actions would consist of knowing it ‘more 
deftly, honestly, realistically, dogmatically etc.’ (Dunn, 1980:106). Talking to agents to encourage them to 
recognise the limits of the accounts they offered about their motivation is akin, Dunn suggests, to 
psychoanalysis. Compare the account suggested here with Bevir, 1999: chs 4, 7 which explains how we 
accommodate distortions such as deception, the unconscious, and irrationality in accounts of beliefs. 
5
 See also Dunn, 1990: 167-170, a discussion of Roberto Unger’s understanding of institutional plasticity. 
6
 Compare Bevir and Rhodes: 2010. 
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regularities could be ignored – they confronted agents, and agents identified them as truths by 
which to guide their action. There might be ‘few, if any’ regularities which could not become 
redundant as a result of future beliefs, but ‘one can hardly give a coherent account of the 
beliefs of an agent without making presumptions about the truth or falsity of any of his 
beliefs about social reality’ (1980: 94). The argument might be individualist, but it need not 
be voluntarist – men made their own history, but ‘some men make far more of their fair share 
of the history of others’ (1980: 94). [205] 
 
A further criticism might be that focusing on the beliefs and desires of agents does not 
account adequately for either causes or consequences. It might miss out the causal role of 
material factors which do not have any impact on consciousness, and it might misjudge the 
material factors which do appear. This was true enough: there was plenty of ‘natural, non-
intentional causality within human history and around human actions’ and so all history could 
not be explained solely at the individual level – there were other entities necessary to 
populate the human sciences (1980: 85, 100). The sticking points, as we have seen, were 
attempts to specify psychological or sociological ‘causes’ which could not be connected in 
any way to human consciousness. Dunn attached great weight to consequences, especially 
unintended consequences, and an accurate assessment of them was a central part of his theory 
of judgment. But they did not raise any problems for a hermeneutic conception of human 
action because they were external matters of fact. It may be a stylistic feature of historical 
narrative to describe a set of actions as causing, say, the First World War, but this was not a 
license to replace the relevant agents’ characterisation of their actions (1980: 105).7 
 
The other difficulties concerned problems with characterising and describing human 
consciousness, and with providing criteria for describing meanings. The first problem was 
best side-stepped: even if one could offer some kind of full verbal transcript of the conscious 
experience of another person, it would not include experiences that could not be rendered in 
words, and would likely include all manner of sentences which we could make neither head 
nor tail of. Better, Dunn argued, to stick with intelligible descriptions of particular agents, as 
expressed in standard hermeneutic units: texts, speech acts and individual or collective 
actions (1980: 98-99). Even this less ambitious task would require enormous simplification to 
                                                          
7
 See Bevir, 1999: 316. 
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be manageable. The second more radical objection arose from Quine’s arguments about the 
indeterminacy of translation. Because of his commitment to holism, such that the meaning of 
words depended on their place in the wider context of language, there could be no single 
manual for translating across languages. These difficulties applied not only to deeply alien 
cultures – radical translation – but also to those which might be comparatively similar. The 
difference between early modern and late modern notions of property was a case in point 
(1980: 96-7). These arguments could be seen to challenge the possibility of an interpretive 
human science, and Dunn’s cautious response provides a good opportunity to summarise his 
broader themes. 
 
These were sceptical but pragmatic. Dunn placed the beliefs and desires of agents centre-
stage, but did not deny the difficulties this raised. There were no ‘cheap ways’ to the 
knowledge of others and the causes of their actions, but nor was the knowledge acquired 
more than provisional. The indeterminacy of translation posed real difficulties for the idea 
that meanings – the core subject matter of the human sciences – could be firmly 
characterised. But, on the other hand, the very existence of the term ‘meaning’ was 
significant: we can and do communicate, we can and do characterise what other agents mean 
(1980: 108-9). In a passage that echoes Macintyre’s conclusions, Dunn argued that 
We all hold more or less well-justified beliefs about the beliefs and sentiments and 
practical situations of others. We all can and indeed must attempt to judge 
methodologically how it is sound to attribute beliefs or feelings to others. Within a 
common physical world we are all radical interpreters of one another, assigning 
beliefs, desires, intentions and meanings simultaneously to one another and trying to 
make sense of conduct by solving the resulting simultaneous equations. (1980: 107)  
There were no methods which could provide guarantees against error, but the absence of such 
methods did not mean there was nothing true to be said (1980: 109).
8
 What was needed – as 
with Macintyre – was greater awareness of the way we interpret ourselves and others, and 
something that Dunn thought akin to the principle of charity: ‘If we claim to know about 
other men, we must try as best we can to give them what is their due, their right. This is a 
simple moral duty, not a guarantee of epistemological prowess’ (1980: 110). 
 
Agency, Revolution and Explanation 
                                                          
8
 See Bevir, 1999: 82-5 for criticisms of Skinner’s logic of discovery. 
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These arguments provided the basis of Dunn’s thoughts both about social explanation and 
political theory which we shall consider in turn. Throughout the 1970s his empirical work 
was in part a means of considering the nature of social explanation. In Modern Revolutions he 
examined eight case-studies as a way of showing the highly variable nature of ‘revolution’ – 
the concept was unlikely ever to be made a sufficiently stable category that could be 
susceptible to scientific analysis (Dunn, 1972: 226-8, 230, 241-3). In particular, he stressed 
that although revolutions were rarely the intended result of actual revolutionaries, he could 
not see how an explanation of their course could avoid ‘an adequate account of the character 
of the wide variety of actions’ that comprise them (1972: 232). The most ambitious attempt to 
provide a sociology of revolution came with Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979), 
which Dunn had positively refereed for Cambridge University Press, as well as offering 
advice on drafting the introduction.
9
 It was, he believed, in many ways a powerful work 
which could also be read as staking bold claims for a new historical sociology. His lengthy 
review, however, brought out important areas of disagreement. He repeated his belief about 
the difficulty of finding appropriate criteria by which to define all revolutions, but noted that 
Skocpol began with theoretical stipulations which enabled her to focus on three complex 
instances of social revolution – France, Russia and China. As is well known, Skocpol’s 
central innovation was to move away from the Marxist fixation with crises of production, and 
instead placed the state centrefold – revolutions were first and foremost crises of states. As 
well as the importance of class relations, she stressed the internal extractive and repressive 
power of the state and its external economic and military power. The latter focus on the world 
economy and the international state system were, for Dunn, major advances in understanding. 
Where he differed strongly was with her relentlessly structural approach which attempted ‘to 
shrink the limits of the role of agency, human understanding and will, the cognitive and 
affective states of human beings’ in favour of the ‘overwhelming causal constraints imposed 
by objective conditions’ (Dunn, 1985: 72). In sum, her models of state collapse refer as little 
as possible to human intentions or judgments. 
 
Why? Dunn sees three reasons. First, the outcomes of revolutions are not intended by any 
agent, that is to say, what revolutionaries suppose themselves to be doing and what they are 
                                                          
9
 Skocpol, 1979: xvi. Dunn’s was fulsome in his praise for Skocpol’s earlier essays (e.g. Dunn, 1980: 320, 338) 
and contrasted his own ‘somewhat crudely nominalist’ work on revolutions with her ‘very proper structural 
corrective’ (Dunn, 1979: 86). 
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in fact doing overlap little. Second, the actual collapse of an ancien régime in any case was 
not caused by revolutionaries, and third, the real cause – the impact of foreign military and 
economic pressure – affected the options open to rulers and not revolutionaries. Dunn agrees 
with the first up to a point, but suggests that the understanding of revolutionaries had some 
causal consequence, and notes that even Skocpol accepts that there were differing options 
available in the process of reconstruction rather than a material determination of the option 
taken. On the second point, the collapse of a regime could not be understood ‘independent of 
the acts of any social actors’, and so the intentionality and judgment of state rulers was a 
relevant consideration. And finally, while the objective factors of revolutionary situations 
might originally be quite distinct from the practice of actual revolutionaries, by the twentieth 
century revolution has become an ongoing international phenomenon, and so the wider 
context of global revolutionaries now played ‘a causal role in creating objective 
revolutionary situations’ (1985: 75). What was really at stake, Dunn suggested, was the 
nature and purpose of sociology and explanation – revolutions pose in the starkest terms 
questions about how much choice humans have over their fate. While it was certainly 
possible to model the collapse of states from the outside – to see them as structural events 
beyond control, it was ‘absurd’ and even ‘perverse’ to think that the construction of new state 
powers in a revolution was ‘a process external to human will or judgment’ (1985: 76). 
Skocpol evades these hard questions, and adopts the structural terminology of possibilities, 
obstacles, options, imperatives, and impossibilities – but, as Dunn notes, even many of these 
terms cannot fully expel the ‘flavour of choice’ which they suggest (1985: 77). 
 
However illuminating structural approaches to explanation were, they were ‘causally 
inadequate’ and, as we shall see, ‘politically misleading’ (Dunn, 1985: 5). Since the mid-
seventies Dunn had become increasingly interested in the centrality of practical reason, and 
the counterfactuals it threw up. The key point to which he returned in a number of essays was 
that political judgment was about making choices and assessing possibilities. This did not 
deny that there were limits to actions, but it was rather a recognition that except in brutally 
determined situations there was always some kind of choice to be made (Dunn, 1980: 226n). 
‘The key truth about politics – morally, politically, theoretically – is always that matters 
could have been different.’ (Dunn, 1978: 214). In order to understand what was actually the 
case at any given time, one needed to think about ‘what could, under other specified 
circumstances, have been the case’ (Dunn, 1979: 106). Thinking counterfactually was the 
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‘central modality of political judgment’ – it was to ‘revel’ in the potential openness of 
history, but at the same time not to be blind to its ‘grubby rationality’ (Dunn 1978: 215). In 
the case of West African States, for instance, Dunn argued that the most minute and detailed 
comparison of the structural properties of each would not be sufficient to explain their 
different political fortunes in the post-colonial period. It simply had to be recognised that 
‘political initiative, and skill, political lethargy and fecklessness’ mattered, that the choices 
made by powerful players did have causal impact (1978: 212, 216). So, when thinking about 
the structural analysis of states one needed to be sure not to confuse what states can do with 
what they must do. An ineliminable feature of what they can do was human belief about what 
was possible, and those beliefs ‘arise from historical experience and change with it’ (Dunn, 
1985: 77). The presumed causal properties of institutions – and the political strategies based 
on those presumptions – alter what both rulers and revolutionaries think it is rational to do. In 
political competition, ‘the strategies of one set of competitors are necessarily predicated in 
some measure on their beliefs about the strategies of others’ (1985: 77).10 This reflexivity 
meant that revolutions varied over time, and that what might seem fixed structures in one 
situation, might not be so in the next. So rather than relying on structures alone to do the 
explanatory work, one had to examine why ‘things as they are’ in light of ‘what factors under 
what circumstances’ would have made them different (Dunn, 1984: 2). 
  
The significance of these claims was developed much more fully by Dunn’s colleague 
Geoffrey Hawthorn. His thinking about the role of counterfactuals – partly inspired by 
Dunn’s work – began in 1979, and culminated in Plausible Worlds (1991). He started with 
the paradox that in the human sciences the more we multiply the causes and reasons we give 
to explain something, that is, the more we appear to be determinate in our explanations, the 
more we increase the possibilities that things could have been different, and so seem to 
decrease the power of our explanation. When considering ‘causes’, most of these turn out to 
have some measure of contingency, and, in any case, in the human sciences, many 
explanations turn not on causal connections but on practical reasonings. Hence there is 
enormous potential for counterfactual possibilities. The task of the enquirer, then, is to assess 
on a case by case basis those possibilities which were genuinely impossible and those which 
were plausible but not chosen (Hawthorn, 1991: 13-15). Some extended case-studies made 
                                                          
10
 Compare Macintyre, 1973; Craig, 2010. 
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the implications clearer. Take the course of plague and the levels of fertility in early modern 
Europe – these are typically seen as part of Braudel’s longue durée, the biological regime of 
‘restrictions, obstacles, structures’ which marked the impossible off from the possible (1991: 
28). In fact, however, Hawthorn argues that things could have been different – in towns, at 
least, political choices might have better controlled the plague, and different choices of 
French policy towards Spain in the seventeenth century – with implications for taxation of the 
countryside – might have pressed less hard on rural fertility (1991: 79). Hence, doubts can be 
thrown on the distinction between structure and agency such that structure is not so much an 
unchangeable set of affairs, but simply a set of affairs that happened not to have changed 
much, but which could have been changed (1991: 79). An alternative example considers the 
politics of the division of Korea after 1945. This might be seen as a classic instance of 
événementielle, a situation where there was a high level of choice among those deciding US 
foreign policy. In fact, though, while the US could have acted differently in not occupying 
Korea in 1945, once there they could not have withdrawn without radically revising their 
reasons for being there (1991: 121). This latter point is key for Hawthorn – assessing 
plausible possibility requires careful consideration of the counterfactual. It had to start from 
‘particular agents in particular sets of circumstances as those agents and sets of circumstances 
actually were’, rather than presuming situations or agents to be radically different from what 
they were (1991: 168). Ultimately, Hawthorn – like Dunn – was sceptical of the generalising 
claims of the social sciences. ‘Practical reasoning is done by particular agents in the light of 
their particular experiences and the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. ... 
Possible reasonings for them are reasonings for them as them, there and then, reasonings that 
they can or could have made as those agents from where they are’ (1991: 34-5). To generalise 
and abstract from this may be habitual in the social sciences, but it is also indeterminate, and 
at the extreme, empty (1991: 35). Hawthorn sympathised with Quine’s arguments about the 
underdetermination of theory and indeterminacy of meaning, and doubted that there could 
ever be cumulative and convergent certainty – the supposed mark of knowledge – in the 
human sciences. 
 
Being Realistic 
 
Dunn’s approach to political theory also emerges from his characterisation of practical reason 
and social life and was in marked opposition to the styles of political philosophy pursued in 
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the USA. As he repeatedly stated, drawing on Macintyre (1983) and Taylor (1983), the point 
of political theory was to understand ‘what is really going on in society’ (Dunn, 1984: 1; 
Dunn, 1985: 1). Unfortunately the historical division of labour within the field of politics had 
been ‘disastrous’, split, as it was, between a purely historicist history of political ideas, a 
political philosophy ‘committed to political inconsequence by the self-conscious purity of its 
methods’ and a political science ‘ludicrously aping the sciences nature and uninformed by 
any coherent conception of political value’ (Dunn 1985: 2). Dunn was keen to overcome 
these divisions and, in doing so, to rethink the way each proceeded. Hence, political theory 
needed to focus on three tasks. First it needed to understand what ‘political structures, 
political institutions, and political relations are actually like at present’ and consider ‘what 
they prevent and what they bring about’. Second it needed to have some sense of how we 
might coherently want society to be, and third it ought to tell us what practically can be done 
to actualise and maintain such a society (Dunn, 1984: 1). Accordingly a core aspect of his 
political theory is understanding the here and now – and especially the sober assessment of 
the nature of global economic exchange and the character and power of modern states and the 
practical limits they impose to possibility (Dunn, 1985: 11). Any conception of politics had to 
consider ‘realistically’ how humans ‘do in fact see and feel about each other in the settings in 
which they live and which they understand (and always will understand) so poorly’ (1985: 
11). It was difficult enough to know ourselves, and understanding others was an even harder 
task, so knowing how to act, when the consequences of our actions – intended, and all too 
often unintended – stretched far beyond our intentionality was daunting. 
 
At heart, then, Dunn’s is a theory of prudence or judgment – ‘not a purely ideal value; it 
necessarily embodies a conception of how the world could, in historical reality and through 
real human agency, be changed to meet its requirements’ (Dunn, 1985: 11; see Bourke and 
Geuss, 2009). The aim here is not to assess the validity of such a theory, but rather to draw 
attention to the way that it emerges out of the characterisation of the practical reason of 
agents, and the social situations in which they necessarily find themselves. It should now also 
be clear how this characterisation provides an inspiration for recent advocates of ‘realism’ in 
politics. This approach defines itself against various forms of moralism in politics – the 
‘ethics first’ approach most conspicuously associated with Rawls. But advocates such as 
Dunn, Hawthorn, Williams and Geuss are not simply restating the realism familiar to students 
of international relations, who dismiss values, principles and ideals as ‘mere window 
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dressing’ and who believe that ‘power and material self-interest are all that matter’ (Geuss, 
2010: 39). Geuss begins where Weber begins – that anyone who wanted ‘tidy solutions’ in 
politics had made a ‘bad mistake in being born as a human being’ (Geuss, 2010: 40). The real 
questions to ask were who has the power and motive to act, and what will the consequences 
be of adopting this, rather than another, course of action. In arguing that political philosophy 
be realist Geuss stresses four features. First, it should not begin with what people ought to 
value and desire but rather with the ‘the way the social, economic, political, etc., institutions 
actually operate in some society at some given time, and what really does move human 
beings to act in given circumstances’ (Geuss, 2008: 9). This does not mean humans lacks 
ideals and aspirations, but that those are only relevant insofar as they affect people’s actual 
behaviour. Second, it must be recognised that politics is about action, motives and contexts 
and not merely about the truth or falsity of beliefs and propositions (2008: 11-13). Third, 
politics was always historically located – ‘humans interacting in institutional contexts that 
change over time’, meaning that excessive generalisation was unhelpful. Fourth, and as a 
consequence, Geuss sees politics as more like the exercise of a craft rather than the 
application of a theory. It required skill and judgment that did not readily lend itself to being 
codified. Taken together, this was what ‘realism’ meant. 
 
By way of conclusion, we can return to the beginning. The father of political history –
Thucydides – provides a useful way of commenting on my opening question about the 
relationship between political ideas and real politics. Although commonly seen as the 
originator of ‘scientific’ realism, this is misleading. While he did disdain explanations which 
placed excess weight on mythology and theology, he nevertheless thought that ‘beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, valuations, even superstitions’ had to be taken ‘very seriously indeed’ if 
one wanted to know ‘what really moves people to act, and what then happens to them and to 
others as a consequence of how they act’ (Geuss, 2005: 226). In this sense ‘ideas’ – in the 
broadest understanding – do matter, but not necessarily in any high-minded way. Hawthorn’s 
recent study of Thucydides on Politics (2014) brings this out well. The History of the 
Peloponnesian War managed to covey a strong sense that the people involved did not have a 
complete sense of what they were doing. Thucydides could do this because, like his 
contemporaries, he did not separate out motives, intentions, and actions, and was not tempted, 
like modern philosophers, to privilege the explanatory importance of ‘reasoned intention over 
unreflected motive’ (Hawthorn, 2014: 17). Politics was agonistic – intentions were not 
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always reasoned, and even when they were, the premises often were not; rhetoric matters but 
was rarely simply truthful or reasonable; events have causes, but they are invariably complex, 
and their effects blend with other effects; people are not bound to act in any one way (2014: 
236). These insights remained relevant, Hawthorn suggested, for two reasons. First, 
irrespective of modern aspirations to global rationality and legality, it remains a world of 
political actors ‘trying more or less imaginatively to achieve what they want to do through the 
exercise of one or another kind of power’. Whatever their virtues they were limited in mind 
and body, subject to the foibles of character, the force of habit, and the ‘unforeseen and the 
unforeseeable’ (2014: 238). If politics is only ever understood as made up of structural forces, 
or as driven by rational choices, or as expressions of a political culture, we will miss what 
any politician knows intuitively. Second, Thucydides challenges us with a ‘moment of 
unillusion’. Ever since Plato, philosophers have turned aside from the messiness of real 
politics, and have instead conjured up visions of some kind of future in which humans might 
be fully at home. Thucydides instead encourages the thought that now, as then, we ‘are naked 
in our political condition’, and that the most appropriate response is to be ‘as realistic as one 
can be about politics as politics’ (2014: 239). Whether this is a congenial conclusion for 
political theory, it surely provides compelling reasons for the serious study of political history 
– not because simple ‘lessons’ or generalizable ‘laws’ can be unearthed, but because a greater 
appreciation of human action in diverse settings may enhance our understanding both of 
possibility and also of necessity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many of the foregoing arguments find ample resonance in the work of Bevir and Rhodes, but 
it may be useful to highlight four themes. First is the stress on the centrality of history. Dunn 
repeatedly argues the need for historical understanding, both in terms of the ancestry of the 
concepts that social scientists and political philosophers use, and also in terms of the actual 
social, economic, and political development of modern states. He believes that political 
history, political science, and political theory should be brought into a more fruitful dialogue 
with each other. Bevir also insists on the centrality of historicism, and argues that even those 
recent political scientists who have argued that ‘history matters’ still tend to cleave to 
modernist commitments to ‘determinism, reification and foundationalism’ (Bevir, 2010: 268; 
see also Adcock et al, 2007: 12-17, 284-9). In addition, he and Rhodes stress the importance 
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of the history of disciplines as a means of understanding and evaluating rival approaches. 
This point can be extended to points of contact across disciplines – indeed, fuller accounts of 
the historical development of the social and human sciences generally may enable stronger 
bridges between them to be built. 
 
The second theme is the importance of agency and contingency. Dunn, Bevir and Rhodes all 
share a broadly individualistic stress on the integrity of the meanings offered by agents, and a 
dislike of holistic concepts that seem to bear no relation to those meanings. Bevir’s account 
of situated agency stresses that ‘social inheritances’ can never fix the beliefs people might 
come to have nor ‘the actions they might try to perform’ (Bevir, 2010: 267, my emphasis). 
Dunn would agree – in this respect history is open and things could be different from how 
they are, but he would surely argue that trying to do something tells us little about succeeding 
in doing something. The irony that much of Dunn’s work considers is that the personal 
experience of agency is not matched by its social reality. 
 
This opens up the third point: the approach to explanation taken by Dunn, and developed by 
Hawthorn. In rejecting the strong sense of structural determinism they do not mean to deny 
that agents face seemingly insuperable obstacles to their intentions. Rather than characterise 
these as enduring ‘structures’, it is better to ask counter-factual questions: other things being 
equal, did the agents have a genuine range of actions they could implement or were they, to 
all practical purposes, constrained to do what they in fact did. Bevir and Rhodes do not 
generally talk in these terms, but they might argue that in order to explain any occurrence we 
need to know about the beliefs of particular agents, and the deeper traditions to which they 
belong. This is certainly part of the answer, but in many cases we will also need to know 
about the beliefs and actions of numerous other agents that may be relevant to the 
explanation.
11
 This may be difficult enough when explaining, say, the decisions of a mundane 
academic committee, but when explaining a complex occurrence, such as the slide to war in 
1914, we need to know about the febrile and fluid responses and counter-responses that 
characterise diverse agents in a state of high tension, and the extent to which their real 
options narrowed over time – as demonstrated in Christopher Clark’s recent account, The 
Sleepwalkers (Clark, 2012: 361-4).  
                                                          
11
 And in the case of economic explanations, would the interpretive approach require us to map the beliefs and 
actions of an astronomically large number of agents?  
21 
 
 
This leads us to the fourth point, this time normative: the need for political judgment to be 
realistic. On the one hand, if the beliefs of agents are relatively open, then it becomes much 
harder for any of us to know – even supposed ‘experts’ – what someone else is going to say 
or do. But, on the other hand, the need to act requires some kind of practical knowledge of 
what is likely to happen, and that may require a measure of realism about what the world is 
really like – at least right now – and therefore prudence in acting in it. Bevir, who places 
hope in a pluralist and participatory democracy which enables citizens to ‘develop voice, 
enter dialogues, and rule themselves’ may find this an unduly pessimistic conclusion (Bevir 
2010: 273). Dunn, however, might reply with the passage from Hobbes’s De Cive which 
characterised the opportunity to show ‘wisdome, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating 
matters of the greatest difficulty’ as the dubious pleasure of seeing ‘our wisdome undervalued 
before our own faces ... to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions, to 
lay open our secret Counsells, and advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit’ 
(Dunn, 1990: 169). 
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